INTRODUCTION
From the earliest attempts to vaccinate animals using whole organisms, to the present efforts using genetically-engineered organisms, the major challenge faced by vaccine developers has been the achievement of an ideal balance between the efficacy and the safety of vaccines. The 'efficacy/safety' or 'benefit/risk' ratio is the central theme of the risk analysis performed by regulatory agencies responsible for the licensing of animal vaccines, although other factors -such as purity, potency and stability -are also carefully assessed.
vaccines are currently undergoing tests at various laboratories. While these novel vaccines may exhibit desirable characteristics, such as inducing cell-mediated immune responses in addition to humoral responses, they also present considerable regulatory challenges, particularly in the area of safety assessment.
It is important for the public to have confidence in regulations which ensure the safety of veterinary biological products, especially live recombinant deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) products released into the environment. To achieve this goal, regulatory assessments should be based on scientific knowledge, and assessment procedures must be sensible and practical. Over the past few years, regulatory agencies have realised that the best way to deal with this issue is through an open and transparent regulatory process based on risk analysis (8, 9, 10) . The essential components of risk analysis are risk assessment, risk management and risk communication (see 'Definitions' below) (8, 9, 16) . While risk analysis is by no means a novel concept, it is clear that significant advances have occurred in this field in recent years. The development of scientifically-valid methods to quantify risk (11, 12) is perhaps the most significant of these advances. Quantitative risk assessment methods have been added to the procedures traditionally used in the evaluation of veterinary biologicals. This paper describes both the qualitative and the quantitative approaches to risk assessment which are used by Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada (AAFC) for making these licensing decisions. A brief description of the present Canadian regulatory framework for licensing veterinary biologicals is also provided.
DEFINITIONS Veterinary biological
Section 2 of the Canadian Health of Animals Act, 1990, defines 'veterinary biologics' as follows: a) any helminth, protozoa or microorganism; b) any substance or mixture of substances derived from animals, helminths, protozoa or microorganisms; or c) any substance of synthetic origin manufactured, sold or represented for use in: d) the diagnosis, treatment, mitigation or prevention of a disease, disorder, abnormal physical state, or the symptoms thereof, in animals; or e) restoring, correcting or modifying organic functions in animals (4) .
'Production outline' and 'Special outlines'
These documents describe the specific procedures used by the manufacturer in the preparation and testing of a veterinary biological (4) . The production outline also contains the label recommendations for the product.
Risk
Risk is defined as the likelihood of occurrence and the magnitude of the consequences of an adverse event; it is a measure of the probability of harm and the severity of impact of a hazard (1) .
Hazard
A hazard is a thing or action which can cause adverse effects (e.g. a live vaccine microorganism which can revert to virulence and cause disease) (1).
Qualitative risk assessment
Qualitative risk assessment is the process of identifying a hazard and characterising or estimating the risk presented by that hazard in qualitative terms (1) .
REGULATION OF VETERINARY BIOLOGICALS IN CANADA
The requirements for licensing veterinary biologicals in Canada are available from AAFC in the form of regulatory documents and guidelines (2, 4, 6) . These documents provide information on a variety of relevant topics, such as acts and regulations (e.g. Health of Animals Act, Access to Information Act) (2, 4) , operating requirements of manufacturing facilities (e.g. establishment licences, inspection protocols), procedures required for the sale of biologicals (e.g. import permits, testing and release of serials [batches] ) and reporting requirements (e.g. adverse reaction monitoring). A summary of these requirements is given below.
Legal authority
The Health of Animals Act and Regulations, 1990, gives AAFC the authority to regulate the production, evaluation, importation and registration of veterinary biologicals in Canada (4).
Licensing requirements
All biologicals approved for sale in Canada must be manufactured at a facility approved and inspected by the national authorities. Manufacturers are required to submit plot plans (scale drawings of the premises), blueprints (floor plans of the building) and legends (description of functions, product handling, equipment and cleaning operations within each room of the facility) to AAFC for review. Following inspection, facilities which meet the criteria described in Section 128 of the Health of Animals Regulations are issued with a 'Veterinary Biologics Establishment Licence' (4). The physical features of the building and the operating procedures at the manufacturing establishment are designed to maintain product quality and consistency. These facilities are inspected regularly to ensure compliance with regulations.
To license a veterinary biological, Canadian and foreign manufacturers must provide data to prove the safety, purity, potency, efficacy and stability of the product. The data must also support claims on labels and in advertisements. The Health of Animals Act and Regulations outline these basic data requirements for product registration in Canada (4) . Before licensing the product, results from pre-licensing testing of serials for purity, potency, safety and efficacy must be submitted by the manufacturer. After licensing, each serial of the final product is subjected to tests for sterility, potency and safety, in accordance with accepted methods. The advertising of veterinary biologicals is controlled under Sections 135 (1), (2) and (3) of the Health of Animals Regulations. All such advertisements require AAFC approval before dissemination by the manufacturer or the distributor. The onus is on the manufacturer or the importer of veterinary biologicals to provide all this information.
A veterinary biological produced in a foreign country must be licensed in the country of origin before a licence can be issued in Canada. In addition to meeting all standard licensing requirements for a Canadian product, foreign products must also undergo an evaluation to determine the potential for introducing foreign animal diseases to Canada. The presence of certain animal diseases exotic to Canada and the likelihood of introducing these diseases to Canadian animal populations via imported veterinary biologicals are significant factors which are evaluated in the licensing process. Also, the regulatory framework of the country of origin of the biological is considered to provide assurance of product quality. Foreign manufacturers of products which meet the above criteria are issued with a 'Permit to Import Veterinary Biologics', which allows them to sell the product in Canada through a designated Canadian distributor. In many respects, the Canadian licensing requirements are similar or equivalent to the United States Department of Agriculture requirements for veterinary biologicals. In certain cases, however, Canada requires additional information on safety (e.g. bluetongue exclusion test results for modified live viral products) or changes to the product submissions from manufacturers in the USA for licensing products in Canada.
Each product manufactured at a licensed establishment must be made in accordance with the procedures described in the 'Production outline' and 'Special outlines' (see 'Definitions' above). The master seeds used for the preparation of veterinary biologicals must be demonstrated to be pure, safe and immunogenic by accepted test methods. Evidence must be provided to prove that cell-lines or primary cells, if used, are pure and safe. Sera, media and any other ingredients used in the preparation of a veterinary biological must be demonstrated to be free of contaminants, by accepted test protocols. The finished products are tested by the manufacturer -using tests which are approved at the time of product registration -to ensure purity, potency, safety and efficacy. AAFC monitors the quality assurance programmes of the manufacturer by conducting random testing of serials. Master seed testing and certification are also conducted by AAFC. Testing is performed in accordance with the Quality Assurance Monitoring Protocols developed by the laboratory for each product category. Suspected adverse reactions and vaccine failures in the field (e.g. deficiency of safety or efficacy) are investigated by AAFC staff, and appropriate measures are recommended to solve the problem. The recommendations may require additional safety studies to be conducted by the manufacturer and/or AAFC, or they may require modification of the product formulation or withdrawal of the product.
The above-mentioned procedures for regulating veterinary biologicals in Canada are intended to ensure the quality and consistency of veterinary biologicals manufactured within or imported into Canada. For certain products, the evaluation of the vaccine submission may involve other government departments, e.g. Health Canada and Environment Canada for the evaluation of human safety and environmental safety, respectively. This regulatory framework adapts well to the risk-based approach used in the evaluation of veterinary biologicals. Moreover, it applies equally to conventional biologicals and to those produced by recombinant DNA technology. The usual procedure employed in the safety evaluation of veterinary biologicals is the qualitative risk assessment method, which estimates the degree of risk inherent in the use of a product. Safety of some products is also evaluated by the quantitative risk assessment method, which yields an estimate of the likelihood of harm and the potential negative impact associated with the use of a product. Both of these risk assessment methods are described in detail below.
RISK ASSESSMENT OF VETERINARY BIOLOGICALS Qualitative risk assessment

Inactivated and modified live vaccines
Veterinary vaccines contain live or killed whole microorganisms or parts of microorganisms as antigen. Inactivated vaccines are usually adjuvanted with chemical (e.g. aluminum salts, saponin) or biological (e.g. bacterial derivatives, cytokines) compounds to boost the immune response of the host. As these vaccines contain no live organisms or agents capable of replicating within the host, the probability of causing severe negative impacts is limited. Potential negative impacts are abiotic in naturesuch as injection site reactions or hypersensitivity reactions -and are limited to the individual animals to which the vaccine has been administered. In contrast, with live vaccine organisms, potential negative impacts are biotic or replicative in nature, and the effects are not necessarily limited to the animal to which the vaccine is administered. For example, a live vaccine organism may be able to replicate and be shed from the host, thus possibly spreading to other animals; this is a potential outcome which must always be considered in the safety assessment of live vaccines.
The factors used in the evaluation of conventional live vaccines by regulatory agencies include the following:
-characterisation of the vaccine organism and purity (exclusion of extraneous agents) -safety, immunogenicity and efficacy of the vaccine -stability and consistency of serials produced.
Safety factors which are usually considered in the assessment of these vaccines include the following:
-virulence or pathogenicity of the organism for the host -potential of the organism to revert to virulence on animal passage -potential to persist in the host -shedding and transmissibility of the vaccine organism.
Live recombinant vaccines
In addition to the factors mentioned for conventional modified live vaccines, the following factors are considered in the safety assessment of live recombinant vaccine organisms:
-molecular basis of attenuation -potential recombination with similar organisms to overcome the attenuated state -environmental persistence of the organism -potential to enter the food chain -effects on immunocompromised hosts.
Also essential is the careful evaluation of the potential risks and consequences of accidental exposure of humans and non-target animals to live recombinant veterinary vaccines. The risk factors considered in evaluation of the human health and safety of the recombinant vaccines include the following:
-potential to cause disease as a result of accidental exposure -oncogenicity -reversion to virulence -potential to cause complications in immunocompromised individuals. Potential human health and environmental risks are usually assessed on the basis of the known molecular and biological properties of parental organisms, and safety studies conducted in animals including (where appropriate) non-human primates.
Risk characterisation
The risks associated with identified hazards may be characterised in terms of the likelihood and expected impact of negative outcomes. Through consideration of the likelihood of harm and the seriousness of the consequences, it is possible to broadly classify veterinary biologicals into low-risk (Class I) and high-risk (Class II) categories (Table I) , using information available on each type of product, scientific knowledge and past experience. This qualitative risk assessment approach, which differentiates products into two broad categories with different risk profiles, helps in the selective application of criteria for further evaluation. The non-viable recombinant-derived products in Class I Deleted genes in Class I or Class II live products may code for virulence, oncogenicity, enzyme activity or other biochemical functions. Added genes may result in the expression of unique marker antigens or the production of novel biochemical by products. Precautions must be taken to ensure that this deletion or addition of specific genetic information does not confer increased virulence, pathogenicity or survival advantages on these organisms which are greater than those found in natural or wildtype forms. Modification must not impart undesirable new or increased adhesive or invasive factors, colonisation properties, modes of survival within the host, oncogenic properties or other deleterious effects. It is important that addition or deletion of genes does not compromise the safety characteristics of these organisms. In most cases, safety characteristics are improved, and such products do not pose any new threat to humans, other animal species or the environment (6).
Quantitative risk assessment
It is clear from the data requirements for live recombinant products that manufacturers must submit results from several different experiments, often with different experimental designs involving the target animal species and non-target animal species. Often, pieces of information are missing, or information requires extrapolation or estimation, as it is difficult to perform the definitive experiments in the laboratory. An example would be the potential recombination between a vaccine organism and a related organism occurring in the wild. Although it is likely that molecular recombination can be demonstrated in the laboratory, by selecting for the optimal conditions favouring such an event, it is (at best) difficult to predict the frequency with which this might occur in the natural environment. In addition, results from different laboratories and scientific opinions from different experts may be conflicting. Nonetheless, it is the responsibility of government regulators to deal effectively with these complex issues and to make balanced decisions.
One way of addressing this problem is to employ a quantitative risk assessment method which is capable of handling the various types of data needed for a systematic evaluation of the potential hazards associated with the use of a product. The method described below involves the use of scenario trees to explore all possible pathways by which potential adverse events might occur following the introduction of a product into the environment. Descriptions of this method, with examples of animal health risk assessment, were published in Vol. 12 (4) of the Scientific and Technical Review of the Office International des Epizooties (13, 14, 15) .
Scenario tree analysis
Scenario tree analysis is very similar to event tree analysis. An event tree starts with a particular initiating event and involves a number of functions (events or states of nature) over time and space leading to a set of possible outcomes emanating from this initiating event. Outcomes depend on the success or failure of the various functions (9, 12) .
The example chosen to illustrate this method is a risk assessment on the proposed environmental distribution of live, recombinant vaccinia-vectored rabies vaccine for the control of rabies spread by raccoons. The model is summarised in scenario tree format in Figure 1 . The parameters used in the mathematical models relating to Figure 1 are presented in Table II . In this example, the initiating event for the scenario tree is the distribution of rabies vaccine using a vaccinia virus vector, in baits which are attractive to the target species, raccoons. The vector used in this system is a thymidine-kinase deficient (TK-) vaccinia virus. A primary advantage of this vector system is that there is no biological possibility of any type of vaccine reversion to rabies. Despite considerable attenuation, however, the vaccinia vector itself was considered -in the risk assessment -to have some potential for untoward effects in humans and animals. The potential negative consequences of the vaccinia vector were therefore used as outcomes of concern in these scenario tree models (Fig. 1) . More specifically, the initiating event (Φ 0 ) represents the distribution by air and by hand of thousands of baits over a 700 km 2 area. Figure 1 portrays the scenario trees emanating from this initiating event, for human and animal exposure to vaccine and TK + vaccinia mutant. The set of pathways includes the exposure of animals to the vaccine organism, the potential for infection with this organism, the potential for thymidine-kinase mutation (TK + ) in vaccinia virus vector, the potential for the establishment of a TK + reservoir in animals, and finally human contact with such infected animals and reservoirs resulting in systemic reactions to the vaccine organism or the TK + mutant. The other pathway involving direct human exposure to baits containing live recombinant vaccine, concerns the potential for immunosuppressed individuals to react systemically to the TK-vaccine organism. Outcomes of concern for the assessment were the potential frequency of systemic reactions in humans and the formation of animal reservoirs of infection with a TK + vaccinia mutant.
One of the main reasons for conducting a quantitative risk assessment is to be able to answer questions about the relative contribution of various sources of uncertainty. In this risk assessment, the uncertainty inherent in the parameters was addressed using probability distributions which incorporated estimates of minimum and maximum limits. Table II presents these input parameters of the scenario trees and their respective probability distributions or point estimates. The parameter subsequent to the initiating event (Φ 0 -bait drop) is the frequency of bait exposure to animals (f1) and humans (f1a). In addition to the target species -the raccoon -other animal species (e.g. foxes, skunks, small mammals, deer, cattle, sheep, goats, dogs, cats) may consume the baits. The proportions of the total number of baits likely to be consumed by the various species are not known. In other field applications using similar baits, acceptance in raccoons varied with the density of bait distribution. Depending on the population density of raccoons, a substantial quantity of baits were expected to be available for other species. Multiple bait consumption was ignored for this model, as no information was available on the frequency of consumption of two or more baits per animal. A conservative point estimate of 1.0 was used as the value for this parameter, indicating that for every bait distributed an individual animal was exposed. On the basis of information obtained from field applications in other countries, only a few baits are expected to be exposed to humans and domestic animals (dogs and cats).
Subsequently, the actual vaccine contact in bait-exposed animals (f2) was considered. Human exposure to the vaccine (f2a) was evaluated from information on prior application of wildlife rabies vaccine baits. Parameter f3 represented the frequency of passive transportation of live TKr vaccinia vector in the oral cavity in the various species. A point estimate of 1.0 was employed as the value for parameter f3, as all animals were assumed to be capable of transporting the vaccine organism in the oral cavity for a short time. This conservative estimate was chosen because information on the survival of TKr vaccinia virus in animals is available for only a few species.
The frequency of infection subsequent to passive transport of the vaccine organism was assessed with respect to the potential for establishing active or persistent infection in animals (f4). For this purpose, safety data were used, in the form of clinical and pathological observations and virus isolation data obtained following administration of the vaccine to target and non-target animal species.
The potential generation of a TK + vaccinia mutant (parameters f5 and f7) as a result of recombination between the vaccine organism and other related poxviruses was assessed on the basis that there was no evidence of any orthopoxviruses being present in Canada, and limited evidence of orthopoxviruses existing in North America. For recombination in either passive transporters or infected animals, the vaccine organism must enter a cell previously infected with an orthopoxvirus and then acquire the TK gene through recombination with that virus. An estimate of the frequency of this occurrence was therefore included in the values computed for these parameters.
The formation of a TK + mutant reservoir (parameters f6 and f8) represented the potential of this event occurring. The estimate was based on the hundreds of millions of vaccinia vaccine doses given to humans to combat smallpox over many years, and the likelihood of exposure of companion animals and environmental contamination which could have led to the formation of reservoir infections. For this assessment, a reservoir in any species of animals was considered to comprise a maximum of 100 individual animals. , fl5 and fl6) . The frequency of contact between humans and animals for all these parameters was obtained from the annual statistics on submissions to AAFC for rabies confirmation. The statistics provided details on the frequency of animal contacts with humans and other animals in the Canadian population, particularly wild animal contacts. These statistics underestimate, to an unknown degree, the 'unfriendly' contacts between humans and dogs and cats, and those wild animal contacts following which there were no submissions to a laboratory for rabies confirmation. Human contact with animal reservoirs carrying TK + vaccinia mutant was considered to be 100 times more likely than contact with individual animals carrying the same mutant.
Parameter f11 and, specifically, its inverse (1-f11) represent an interpretation of the evidence regarding the level of immunodeficient persons (persons with acquired immunodeficiency syndrome [AIDS] ) in the population. This indicated the proportion of humans at high risk who were likely to be exposed to the TK" vaccinia organism. In turn, parameter f12 introduced the evidence with respect to the frequency of systemic reaction in this high-risk population. Systemic reactions considered for this assessment were equated to post-vaccinal encephalitis and progressive vaccinia following smallpox immunisation in humans.
Similarly, the inverse of fl7 quantified the proportion of the population considered to be at high risk to the TK + vaccinia mutant, namely children under two years of age, pregnant women and AIDS patients. Parameters fl8 and fl9 brought into the model the potential frequency for systemic reaction to TK + mutant organism in high-risk and lowrisk populations, respectively.
A mathematical simulation (Latin hypercube) consisting of 5,000 iterations was performed using a commercial software program, to obtain quantitative estimates of the outcomes of interest. Table III presents the output of the simulation for these outcomes of interest, i.e. the likelihood of reservoir formation in animal populations and systemic Table III) . Table III represents only the likelihood component of the risk assessment. In addition, an assessment of the health, economic and environmental consequences would be considered. This would include a full assessment of health effects from systemic infections in humans, including fatalities, and the associated costs of health care and hospitalisation, as well as the environmental impact associated with the establishment of animal reservoirs of infection.
When combined with the qualitative assessment described above, the information gained from this quantitative risk assessment results in a solid scientific foundation which can be used effectively in the regulatory decision-making process. The 
RISK MANAGEMENT
As defined above, risk management is the process of identifying, evaluating, selecting and implementing alternatives to mitigate risk (1) . Risk management to maintain the established safety standards of a veterinary biological is accompanied by measures which reduce the risk associated with the use of the product. For conventional biologicals, acceptable standards of safety are well-defined, and they are used consistently in the risk management process. Risk management measures include the following:
-specific instructions on labels to limit the use of a product to certain species or to exclude animals in a certain physiological state (e.g. pregnancy)
-inclusion in label inserts of contra-indications and warnings for the use of product Monitoring the use of product during stages b) and c) reduces the level of uncertainty regarding data, and allows regulators to evaluate critically the safety of the product before granting a licence. Sometimes, the best risk management option available to regulators is the refusal to license a particular product in Canada.
Although regulatory decisions are heavily influenced by the outcome of sciencebased risk assessments, other non-scientific factors also influence this process. For example, proposals to release live genetically-modified vaccine organisms may raise complex and often conflicting social and political issues. These non-scientific factors include the following: -challenges resulting from the fact that novel products of biotechnology are unfamiliar to many people -occasional opposition to the use of such products by special interest groups -economic and political issues -cost of monitoring the field use of products.
Depending on the circumstances, mitigative actions may include the following: -controlled environmental release of live recombinant vaccines -measures for safe transport, handling and disposal -measures to be taken in case of accidental human or animal exposure -contingency planning on ways to control or contain the unwanted spread of the organism in the environment.
RISK COMMUNICATION
Effective risk communication is an essential component in risk analysis performed by regulatory agencies. Important in this regard are an understanding of public perception and sensitivities about risk, measures to facilitate dialogue between scientific experts and the public to develop a societal consensus, the creation of specific communication approaches to target audiences and the development of methods to overcome communication problems (8) . The standard approach used by AAFC in communicating risks to the public occurs in two phases, as follows: a) acquisition of information, and consultation and sharing of information with different groups b) dissemination of information to all stakeholders, and feedback and evaluation.
In the first phase, information provided by the manufacturer of a product is assessed by reviewers from AAFC and other Federal departments (e.g. Health Canada and Environment Canada, where applicable) as part of the risk assessment process. The scientific information on risk assessment, together with other factors considered in risk management decisions taken by AAFC and other Federal agencies, are presented in an 'Environmental Assessment' document. In phase b), this document is distributed to all stakeholders and is made available to all interested parties for comment. Public consultations may also be held to provide explanations, listen to concerns and move toward consensus. If the findings indicate that the product is within acceptable limits of risk, it will be granted registration in Canada. For some products, mitigative measures and monitoring are an essential condition for release into the environment. Under the provisions of the Environmental Assessment and Review Process Order in Council, 1984, registration of some products may require a hearing by a panel for public review before approval (3, 5) . Products considered as presenting unacceptable risks to animal, human or environmental health will not be registered in Canada.
CONCLUSIONS
The recent emergence of more exacting environmental regulations has necessitated changes in the traditional approach to evaluating veterinary vaccines by the regulatory agency in Canada. For example, a broader definition of safety -which includes specific examination of animal, human and environmental safety -is now a standard requirement in the evaluation of vaccines. Moreover, the advent of biotechnologyderived veterinary vaccines (in particular, live recombinant vaccines) which may be released into the environment, has forced regulators to find better ways to conduct risk analyses of these products. The quantitative risk assessment method described above represents one such approach which can be used as a tool in the risk analysis of any veterinary vaccine, regardless of the technology used in its manufacture. Continuous improvement and refinement of risk analysis techniques to face emerging challenges (e.g. guidelines for licensing 'naked DNA' vaccines) will be crucial to an informed and responsive regulatory process in Canada. 
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